

parent put out of being. I imagine that the decision would be something like this, 'it was the duty of the servant to have *preserved* the loan, but not to reproduce it, and as his children were involved in the covenant stipulations, they must share the consequences.' If it was his duty to have reproduced it, it would have been his duty to have exercised two divine attributes, namely, omniscience and omnipotence; omniscience to recognize the identical particles, and omnipotence to collect them together. Now the exercise of infinite perfections can never be the duty of finite mortals. An intelligent master, particularly a philosophical one, would never blame his servant for not reproducing the inflammable materials, though he might justly censure him for his wickedness, and punish him and his posterity for the non-performance of his commands. The justice of this would arise out of their abuse of what they received from him, agreeable to the tenor of the covenant into which they entered.

Now allow the parties referred to, to represent Adam with all his posterity in covenant with their Maker. Suffer, for the sake of illustration, the paper material to resemble the principle of holiness which the Divine Creator imparted to Adam, for the well being of both him and his posterity; and then permit a likeness of conduct to exist between the parties, the one in destroying the paper, and the other in sinning against God. The question is precisely this, was it Adam's duty to have re-produced the principle which he destroyed? This question divides itself into two parts, (*viz.*) the *nature* of commanding authority, and the ground on which it must rest in the case before us. The first part of the question receives for answer, *right*, and the second that of *relation*. A master commands what is *right*, and his right is based upon the relation which the servant sustains. And 1. He requires a fair and full exercise of mechanical agency in conformity to his commands. 2. The preservation of whatever property may be committed to his trust; together with a faithful application of the same. This is the case with regard to Adam, his Maker required a fair and full

exercise of all his powers, both mental and mechanical. He could not require any more, because he could have no right in what was not possessed; nor could the extent of his right be larger than the capacity of the things conveyed. Then as to the ground on which he rested his claims, which is that of *relationship*. And here it will be observed, that it was the relation of a finite mortal to an infinite God. Jehovah therefore cannot demand infinite agency from a finite being. This would destroy the justice of his claims, and the holiness of his nature. Now though to lose the principle was the act of the creature, to implant it was the work of the Creator. And if it was Adam's duty to have regained the principle, it must have been his duty to have exercised the perfections of God. This Jehovah could never require, and therefore it could never be the duty of Adam to have it after it was totally destroyed. Of course it cannot be the *duty* of mankind to have what requires the exercise of eternal attributes.

But if in the case supposed, the master was to bring a number of the servant's miserable posterity into his family, and enrich them, not with paper currency, but *gold*, which would endure the fire, and which could never be lost; and which he did as a sovereign favour, in conformity to his discriminating purposes. Would it be the *duty* of even those who compose the family, to obtain the favour, if at least the favour was unconditional and sovereign? Most assuredly it would not. Then if so, it is impossible to conceive how it could be the duty of those who never will be in the family, and respecting whom there is a fixed design not to bestow it. Now in my thoughts there is as much difference between the principle of holiness in Adam, and the principle of grace in a believer, as there is between paper and gold; which grace is bestowed as a free sovereign favour, arising out of a new covenant relation; and is unconditional and discriminating. As such it cannot be the duty of even those who are interested in the covenant; and if not, it is impossible to conceive how it can be the duty of those who are under the *old*

covenant, to have that holiness which is the spontaneous production of the *new*.

I have thus examined the arguments adduced by Mr. Dwight, and leave the reader to judge for himself. And not to detain him much longer on this subject, a few remarks on some assertions found in an article on redemption, by the Rev. S. Green, shall conclude the enquiry. They may be found in a work entitled, "Miscellanies relating to the holy scriptures," &c. the principal of which are as follows :—

"If it should be asked," says Mr. G. "of what use is a universality of value, if there be a speciality of intention? I answer, an infinite price is requisite for the redemption of a single sinner," page 133. This argument has only a visionary basis, and the pillar that has no foundation can afford no support to the dome which is placed upon its head. Such pillars are adapted to no sort of buildings, if we except castles in the air. If an infinite price is necessary for one sinner, of course it is for another, and then we shall have as many infinite prices, and as many infinite sacrifices as there are redeemed mortals; which will be a great number that no man can number. Mr. G. seems to think, that Christ died *really* for one as much as another, and that the only discriminating feature of redemption is a speciality of *design*. Now in my thoughts Mr. G. must be *really* an arminian, though *intentionally* something else. The only thing that softens the charge, is the speciality of his *design*. Perhaps the Rev. gentleman will explain the utility of the Redeemer's suretyship, his substitution, the imputation of sins to him, and his suffering for sins as thus imputed, agreeable with his notions of a general atonement. If an infinite atonement was necessary for one sinner, the same may be presumed respecting one sin, which Mr. G. I have no doubt will admit. And if so, the imputation of sins to him, and causing them to meet on him, must be all a farce; and what the scriptures represent as *real*, and really dreadful, is nothing more than fictitious imagery. In addition to this, how could he be

a surety for his church any more than the rest of mankind? And how then can the benefit of his suretyship be appropriated to his people? It will be said, it secures the fulfilment of Jehovah's discriminating designs. But this makes him a surety for God, and not for his church; and is like saying, if God does not fulfil his intentions I will. Such cannot be the scriptural idea of this important doctrine. He was Surety for those in whose behalf he suffered; see 1 Peter iii. 18. He suffered for *sins*, that he might bring to God those for whom he suffered. His design appears to be as extensive as those for whom he suffered. 2. Says Mr. G. "It accords with, and is the *ground* of the free invitations of the gospel." *ibid.* No such thing. It is an atonement limited both in value and design, which lays the basis for free invitations. According to Mr. G.'s theory, the invitations, though unrestricted, are trammelled by unperformable conditions, and therefore far from representing a free salvation. But the spiritual and unprejudiced reader of his bible, will easily perceive that the free grace of God is represented not in *conditional*, but *characteristical* terms.

But what sort of a sufficiency is it that forms the ground of general invitations? Has it *expiated* the sins of the non-elect? No. Will the atonement save any more than the elect? No; for that is agreed on both sides. Can they be justified if their sins are not atoned for? No; for that is admitted to be impossible. Has it reconciled an angry God towards the non-elect? It has done no such thing; for they are driven away in their wickedness. Has it merited their exemption from punishment? This cannot be, for then they would not be sentenced to everlasting torments. Does it invest them with a right to spiritual favours? This is contradicted by facts. Will there ever be another expiatory sacrifice? That is a thought characterized by ignorance. Then what can the atonement do for them? Why truly it can do just *nothing at all*. And indeed it is of that nature as to do either *all* or *nothing*—either every one thing or no one thing. Again, are the non-elect in a state of *possible* salvation? They are not. Has God appointed them

to misery? He has. Are his appointments immutable? Most certainly. Then what is to be done? It is evident they can do nothing themselves; and it is as clear that God has thought well to pass by them. Their condemnation is as sure on Mr. G.'s scale of things as mine. There is, however, this difference, on my system things are represented as they really exist, and sinners receive the effects of their sinful conduct, according to the holy law of God: but according to Mr. G. a fictitious representation of things is made, and Jehovah deepens their misery and enlarges their damnation by offering what he never will bestow; and what is worse, what he never *designed* to impart. "And as this view of the subject shews that there is a sufficiency of provision, if men will but come to the marriage; so on the other hand, it shews that the *will* and intention are the same in each of the persons of the blessed Trinity,—that in each there is *no intention* to save any but *those who shall actually be saved.*" p. 134. Then it seems according to this, that God does not really *wish* them to take the proffered blessings, nor has he any design to impart them. The Son it appears redeemed all mankind *really*, but not *intentionally!* And notwithstanding the general offers made to all, the Holy Spirit will regenerate none but those whom he has *designed*. Now under such circumstances, how am I to give general invitations? Am I to tell them that God makes an offer of salvation to them all? Of course I must. Then can I inform them that God intends to bestow those offers, without any respect to persons? It is said no. Must I tell them that though they are not elected, they may nevertheless be saved if they will? That would be absurd. Am I to tell them that they can perform the conditions by which the proffered mercies are to be possessed? No; this is not allowed. Am I to inform them that the Holy Spirit will assist any of them, if they will but ask? It is said he will regenerate none but those whom he has *designed*. Am I to say, true, God has not wrote your name in the Lamb's book of life, and therefore you cannot be saved; but he has offered salvation to you, though he never intends to bestow it? How ridiculous should I appear!

In speaking of the atonement as a superfluous one, Mr. G. observes, 'Let it not be objected that here is a superabundance of provision; not only bread enough, but bread enough, and to spare. If there be, it is a necessary superabundance. Not one sinner could have been redeemed without an infinite ransom, a ransom sufficient in point of value for the redemption of every individual of the human race.'—p. 134.

But a redundancy in the atonement is objected to, nor has Mr. G. done any thing towards removing it. Let us, however, examine what he has done. Two things are presumed, and on these presumptions the objection is thought to be deprived of its force. The reader is aware, that the things assumed are, *the infinite demerit of sin and the infinite merit of Christ*.

The reader will forgive me if I address a few queries and a few remarks, personally to Mr. G. and I hope the Rev. Gentleman himself, will be disposed to pass by my transgression in this respect.

1. Do you, my dear Sir, really conceive that every sin, or any one sin, deserves unlimited punishment? i. e. punishment infinitely intense and durable? Your statements seem to convey such an idea; if they do not, they are of no service to your cause. Regarding this as your meaning, allow me to ask,

2. If every sin subjects the sinner to an infinitude of punishment, can there be any *degrees* in sin?

3. If not, will you explain the doctrine of forgiveness, relation, feeling, and action?

4. If there are degrees in wickedness, and one sin is of greater magnitude than another, what is the *maximum* of a sin which approaches the nearest to one of an infinite extent?

5. If there are degrees in sin, and yet every sin is infinite, I ask, are there great infinities and little infinities? and if so, are we not capable of comprehending infinity? at least, a *small* one?

6. Do you conceive, that any possible number of degrees can constitute immensity? If you do, may not things arrive at such a pitch, as to be rendered either infinite or finite, by the influence of one *single*

degree? Thus for instance, infinity is immeasurable, but add one degree to a measurable substance, and it will render it an immeasurable one; take away the degree, and that which was immeasurable is subject to the rules of dimension. Now it appears to me, there are no substances so small but they might be smaller, and none so large but they might be larger; the same may be said of space. In my view, nothing is infinite but *God himself*, and as well might a person attempt to occupy all the parts of a square with an aggregation of circles, as to fill immensity with degrees.

7. Do you believe that there are degrees of punishment in hell? If not, how will it be more tolerable for Sodom and Gomorrah in the day of judgment, than for those cities and villages, which rejected the evidence and ministry of the Messiah?

8. If there are degrees of misery in another world, (which evidently there are) and every sin is infinite, how can a great number of infinities produce limited sufferings, varying in its degrees? Having surveyed this assumption, permit me to take a hasty glance at the other. Respecting which, I enquire,

1. Do you believe that the atonement consists in the merit of Christ?

2. Do you believe that the merit of Christ arose out of his sufferings?

3. Do you believe that his sufferings were *necessary*? And that it was possible for him to have suffered either *more* or *less* than what he did?

4. Do you conceive that if he had suffered *less*, his sacrifice would have been less meritorious? and *vice versa*.

5. If you answer in the *negative*, I request information on the following points, 1. How the measure of those sufferings which he experienced could be *necessary*. 2. How they can bear any relation and *proportion* to his *merits*. 3. How God could punish his Son *unnecessarily*. 4. How Jehovah could be *sincere* in calling him his well-beloved Son, and yet taking pleasure in bruising him without a necessary cause?

6. If you imagine his merit is proportioned to his

sufferings, let me ask, 1. If he had suffered *less*, would the atonement have been *less* than infinite? 2. If he had suffered *more*, would the atonement have been *more* than infinite?

7. If you resolve the measure of his sufferings into the *will* of God, must you not plead for an *arbitrary* salvation, and subject yourself to the force to those enquiries under query 5? In my view the sufferings of Christ were not necessary because they were *willed*, but were willed because they were *necessary*. In this affair, the will of God was guided by *necessity*, and not necessity by his *will*. In all his operations he never violates either his justice or his judgment.

On page 124, you conceive of sin as being infinite in its *nature*, because of its relation to an infinite Being. Now if that is true, I ask, is not our obedience to the law *infinite*? And would not the sacrifice of a mere man be infinite if it was offered to an infinite Being? And further, if an action is characterized by the relation it bears to its object, i. e. if the action of a creature becomes infinite in its nature, by sustaining a relation to an *Infinite* Being, may not the action of an Infinite Being become finite in its *nature* in consequence of its relation to a finite being? and if so, it seems to me, as if the attributes of God are not infinite in their *nature*, because there is nothing infinite besides himself. But on the other hand, the actions and attributes of a finite being are infinite in their *nature*, because they are so in their relation. Now whatever is *natural* is *real*, and whatever is not natural can be but *imaginary* or *artificial*; so that according to this reasoning, *we* are *really infinite* in our attributes and actions, because they are *naturally* so; and the attributes and actions of God are *really finite*, because they are *naturally* so. Now if this is true, why should we find fault with any person for calling himself *God*? It is a term of *modesty*; *infinitely* more modest than the sentiments I am examining. And why should the apostle represent as presumptuous, the claims of the man of sin, when exalting himself above all that is called God? Either Paul could not be of your sentiments Sir, or you

must consider him as a novice for making such an unhappy observation.

But if sin is infinite in its nature, I ask, how could it be atoned for? Certainly there are a plurality of sins, and if one sin demands an infinite atonement, an infinite atonement cannot be more than sufficient for one sin, and if not, either there is but one sin atoned for, or else there is a plurality of atonements.

I contend therefore, *First*. That sin is not infinite in its nature, and that as such, an infinitude of punishment is not its desert. *Second*. That therefore the atonement is not infinite. 1. Because it is not *necessary*. 2. Because it is *impossible*. The *nature* of his atonement is characterized by that nature which suffered, which was *finite*; and the *extent* of the atonement, is measured by the *extent* of his sufferings which were *limited*. Should it be said the divine nature of Christ must make the atonement infinite in its nature though not in its extent, because its extent was measured by his sufferings, I answer, the nature of the atonement is that of *suffering*, and as this was peculiar to the human nature of Christ, it seems more just to characterize it by that nature which suffered. Should it be observed, the sufferings of Christ were of infinite worth because related to an infinite person, I reply, then one single *pang* would have been sufficient to have redeemed the whole world, because it would have constituted an infinite atonement. I submit that the atonement consist in Christ's bearing the exact measure of wrath due to all the sins of all his people, however numerous and extensive their sins might be. So that had more been saved more suffering would have been experienced by the suffering Son of God; and *vice versa*. Let this be granted, and I shall not contend about the terms by which the atonement is characterized.\*

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\* *Note*. If a distinction is made between the nature and extension of a thing, I have no hesitation in admitting the doctrine of an infinite atonement, so far as the divinity of Christ is concerned. But as divinity alone could not atone, the extent of the atonement is measured by suffering. And as Christ did not suffer for any besides the elect, there cannot be a sufficiency for any more. The argument drawn from general sufficiency must fall to the ground, because the *sufficiency* of the atonement is *really limited*.

You will observe, Sir, that the objection still remains, and remains as fast too, as the Peaks of Derbyshire, or the mountains of the Cordillereas.

Further, you have attempted to establish a superfluous atonement, by reasoning from redemption to the divine bounty in providence, which you contend is *redundant*. Allow me, Sir, to observe, that such reasoning must be regarded, as weak and inconclusive. For 1. You have mistook the extent of the divine bounty, in the kingdom of nature. There is no such thing as a *redundancy* in nature; every drop of water in the ocean is necessary, every plant has its insects and relations. The variety of genus, and still greater variety of species, together with all their individuality of existence, have individual relations, connexions, and harmonies, in the kingdom of nature—are all fed and cared for, by the great Author of all existences. What may appear to you an *extravagance*, is a wise and necessary provision. Your subject therefore, Sir, must fail of being illustrated by the bounty of divine providence; and if there is any force in such analogical reasoning, it must be claimed in all the extent of its energies by the sentiment you are aiming to subdue. 2. Supposing that the theory of a superabundance in the divine bounty could be established, that would not prove a superabundance in redemption; for this reason; his bounty is the production of his *power*, but redemption is, provision which is made by the *blood* of his Son. His bounty consists in things which perish in their using, but the blessings of redemption are everlasting benefits. And *can* you imagine, Sir, that the blood of Christ is of no more worth than a shower of rain, or a few bulbous roots and useful grasses? 3. When you affirm that the rain falls in the sea where it is of no use, do you mean to affirm, Sir, that the blood of Christ is distributed without any discrimination, like water precipitated from a sweeping cloud?—that it ever falls without being efficacious? 4. You ought to have observed, that the means by which the divine bounty is preserved and encreased, is by *human industry*. But this cannot be predicated of spiritual

mercies. Beside the *laws*, the *agency*, and the *design*, by which temporal and spiritual mercies are enjoyed are very different, all of which you have overlooked. I would only observe, that to attempt the proof, or even the illustration of your sentiments by such a method of reasoning, is *faint indeed*.

You further remark, 'It may indeed be objected, that the limitation of intention as much invalidates the doctrine of the freeness of the gospel invitations, as the limitation of the value of the death of Christ. Here, Sir, you seem to have mistook the thing altogether. It is the limited nature and extent of the atonement as before observed, which forms the basis of *free* and *limited* invitations. The invitations regard a spiritual condition of mind, which condition is produced by the free implantation of spiritual life. Salvation is as freely wrought *in* the sinner, as it is *for* the sinner. But if you mean, a limited intention *restrict* the invitations as much as a limited value, you have raised an objection which you cannot overthrow, without invalidating the declarations of Jehovah, militating against his perfections, and involving his character in falsehood and disgrace. Perhaps, Sir, you will oblige me by perusing the remarks I have made on this subject in the preceding pages.

The patience of a saint may be exhausted, and I therefore appeal anew to those of the reader while I produce another quotation. 'It may be said,' you continue, 'if the marriage dinner is sufficient for all that are invited, of what avail is it if none can come to it but the elect.' Such an interrogation seems natural enough, and if you can frame a solid answer thereto, you are certainly one of a thousand. You proceed, 'this objection is *easily* removed.' This, Sir, is all on your side; and if we do not find it removed, it must be owing, I should presume, to either folly or fatigue, or else to indolence, or to some occult thing beyond my apprehension. You reason thus, 'what prevents their coming? Is it election? No.—Does non-election prevent their coming? No. What then? I answer, *human depravity*. Men *will* not come to Christ that they may have life. Their

will is under the tyrannical servitude of sin and satan. And this is a bar which cannot be removed by any thing but the free and discriminating grace of God.'

Thus, Sir, you have answered the objection; and it must be admitted that you have handled it very *easily* indeed; so easily as to leave it just where you found it, unanswered, and almost *untouched*. If, Sir, you was to provide a dinner for all the neighbourhood of Bluntisham, would you buy up all the provision in Europe, or in England, or in Huntingdonshire, or even in St. Ives? But allow that you would purchase a superfluity of provision, and pay for it in the sufferings of an only begotten son, by bruising him with a rod of iron, or lacerating his flesh by a knotted whip; I do not imagine that you would act thus, but supposing that was to be the case, would you do it with a view of benefiting the dead as well as the living? Would you command those whom you employed in conveying the intelligence to the neighbourhood, to invite the dead as well as the living, and to inform them if they did not come, they would find their condemnation increased at the last day? But suppose, Sir, they were to do as you are in the habit of doing, invite them without their master's command, what would you think of their conduct? Would you think their invitations were available to any beside the living? And would you not probably, speak of their conduct in the strongest terms of reproach? But, Sir, their conduct is as defensible as your's, and your's is as absurd as their's. They might urge, 'you told us to invite every one, and death does not destroy human identity. Besides, there is nothing to hinder their coming except a few feet of earth, which is but a trifling consideration.' Would you not, Sir, consider that the extent of your invitations involved the consideration of *life*. And though there might be no force employed to prevent the dead from coming, you would be aware that the introduction of life would be necessary before there could be any propriety in calling them, or before the provision could be of any *use* to them. You would say, why they might just as well have invited the grave stones and grave rails, as those whose name and memory

they are designed to record. There is an entire absence of natural life in dead people, and a total absence of spiritual life in dead sinners. And whatever natural powers they possess, and however vigorous may be their will, it is evident, according to your own statements in the concluding part of the last quotation, that nothing neither *will* nor *can*, be of any spiritual advantage to them, until free and discriminating grace is interposed in their behalf. Allow me to say, that instead of removing the objection, you have actually given more weight to it. Had I not have proved the inutility of offered grace in other places, I would pursue the subject in this.

As to election and non-election, I must request you to read my thoughts upon predestination. I will only add one remark, which is this, spiritual invitations are as useful to *dead bodies* as they are to *dead sinners*.

Bear with me, Sir, if I remark, that general invitations after discriminating statements, is like finishing a good performance with a *silly after-piece*; like concluding solid truths with poetical romances or dramatical probabilities. Such ministers, seem to me something like silk-worms, which for a time draw their silken lines within the limits prescribed, but afterwards leave their sphere of usefulness to ramble unconfined, and to end their career in the character of *common flies*. Just so people of unconfined addresses, the former part of the time allotted for speaking they, sometimes employ in drawing the lines of love and mercy within the compass of sovereign design; but before they conclude their discourses, they burst from the sacred enclosures by way of *improvement*, ramble upon the dark mountains of Edom, and complete their excursions by degenerating into the character of common arminians. And only look, Sir, how harsh and discordant such things are; it is like beginning by free grace, and ending with a salvation by works. To me it seems, as if the clattering noise of general invitations must destroy the silvery tones of a free grace gospel. In music the ear is reconciled to strong transitions of key by the influence of intervening discords; but, Sir, alas for us, you have nothing to break the fall. After

the nightingale's song our ears are afflicted with the wood-pigeon's *coo*, or the chaffinch's note.

In proportion, Sir, as I examine your sentiments on this head, I feel an encreasing conviction that they are destitute of any foundation in the bible, and that they are completely at variance with the attributes of God, the doctrines of the gospel, and general good sense. You have not forgotten, Sir, that some time back you observed, my sentiments were twisted about me like ivy about a tree, and that you despaired of freeing me from their complicated sinuosities. This have constrained me to say of my creed, what Rachael did of her sister. Gen. xxx. 8. נפתולי אלהים בפהלחי. By the *twistings*, agency, or operation of God, I am intertwined with my sister—I am *intwisted*, *interwoven*. Or, as *Aquila*, 'God hath *intwined* me, and I am intertwined.' And if you judge my sentiments are twisted and coiled about me in rather a singular manner, you must know, Sir, that they are *twisted* about me by the *agency* and *operation* of *God*. I did not receive them at an academy, neither was I taught them by man, but by divine agency, which produced many mental throbs, and many distressing sensations. Indeed, Sir, they felt their way about me but very slowly at first, but I find them now, to be growing with my experience, and keeping pace with my enquiries after divine truth. I ought likewise to inform you, that they are protruding their little fibrous shoots into every little aperture, and twisting and coiling themselves about my heart so as to be really living in my affections. The Spirit of truth, is causing them to be wound and bound closer and closer to my heart and soul; so that were you to see me now, your admiration, Sir, would be *infinite*. You might say without departing from truth, "*God hath entwined him, and he is entwined.*" You will also perceive, that as they *adorn* me, I endeavour to *support* them; and if I am a *little stiff*, you must not forget how *close* and *tight* my creed is fastened about me.

But, Sir, supposing that my sentiments hung dangling about me, so as to be shifted off by a very slight effort, what, I ask, would you recommend in lieu thereof, sup-

posing that I had any desire to divest myself of them? An atonement *really* general, though *designedly* special? This would not suit me; I dare not trust myself with it. It would soon carry me into the company of Watson, Benson, Clarke, &c. next I should want to visit Leyden, and from thence I should be conveyed to Poland without ceremony, and from there nobody can tell where; perhaps to visit the shrine of Voltaire, and compliment the famous Carlisle. "My steps (said David) were almost gone, my feet had well nigh *slipped*." I am aware that some people *slip* into your sentiments, without slipping to their extremity; but this would not be my case; if I was to drop into them, I should certainly slide as far as they would carry me; which I imagine would be no *small* distance. I should soon form a league with arminians, in *design* as well as *reality*; then shake hands with the socinian brethren, and deny the atonement altogether; next be characterized as a respectable deist, and at last become engulfed in atheism. What a mercy, that I am entwined with what prevents my feet from sliding to such lengths!

I have thought, Sir, that if people would but read the scriptures with both eyes, and without glasses, they would certainly abandon the flimsy system of offered grace and general invitations. But I must say with you, Sir, 'when we consider the depravity of human nature, and recollect that no natural qualification, nor acquired advantages, are sufficient to remove the ignorance and prejudice of the carnal mind, or to teach the true knowledge of God, we account for the fact, and feel the necessity of divine influence.' I will only ask, Sir, how general invitations can be available to such people?

*Remark 1.* The sentiments for which I plead harmonizes, and glorifies all the perfections in the Godhead; which is more than can be said of general sufficiency, or an atonement thought to contain a universality of value. The reason is, because it makes the satisfaction of Christ to be a satisfaction of *choice* and not of *right*—*arbitrary* and not *necessary*. Whereas my view of the atonement makes the satisfaction of Christ to con-

sist in *necessity* and *right*. Demanded as necessary, and accepted as equitable—it was demanded and accepted because it was *right*. Thus all the perfections of God are honoured, Christ is exalted, and the church is saved.

*Remark 2.* This view of the atonement militates against all erroneous views of the gospel. Against arminianism and Wesleyanism, inasmuch as it pleads for the perfection of the divine law, the immutability of justice, and the complete deliverance of all those who are redeemed by Christ. Wesleyans are obliged to deny the perfection of Jehovah's law, when they plead for general redemption and final apostacy. If Christ made a full atonement for every one of their sins, the law must be fulfilled in their room, and justice satisfied in their behalf. Jehovah must also abrogate that law by which their ransom was effected, and that in order to accomplish their damnation. Then again, if every sin they committed is not atoned for, the law by which they sinned must be rescinded: so that Jehovah must dispense with his eternal law, in order to save any one. Let methodists take which side of the question they please, they must be *law-abrogators*; and notwithstanding all their zeal against a certain class of people, they are but doctrinal antinomians after all. I am surprized that they are not aware of this.

But further, this sentiment operates strongly against the notion of those who plead for the total abolition of the moral law by the death of Christ. This shews that the law is established by the death of Christ, as well as fulfilled and honoured. Indeed, it is not easy to conceive how any law, which is holy, just, and good, can be honoured by its abrogation.

Equally hostile is my view of the subject to the systems of Messrs. Baxter and Fuller; the former contended for a remedial law, and the latter fought for an atonement under a sort of *merciful* law! And indeed, the law of God is so connected with the atonement, that every unscriptural view of redemption is sure to come in collision therewith; the creed of a general invitationist, if true, involves the destruction of God's most holy law.

*Remark 3.* The view which I have taken of this subject presents us with a *full* atonement. This is what cannot be rightly affirmed of any view opposed to the one I have taken. A general sufficiency and general invitations, are general *expletives*. I have proved by arguments, various and conclusive, that what is termed a general sufficiency, leaves us with a general deficiency; and the same arguments will apply to the Wesleyan notion of general redemption, which is built upon the same principle; the only difference which exists, is in the *imagination*. Mr. Wesley says he died for all mankind with a view of saving them all. Mr. Fuller says he died for all, with a view of saving some; or, in other words, that his death was sufficient to save all the world of mankind, but that he never designed saving only a remnant according to the election of grace.

And it is but justice to say, that in my thoughts the abolition of the law of God, by the death of Christ, would render his atonement insufficient for the salvation of one single individual, and place it, for *substance*, on the same basis as Messrs. Wesley, Baxter, and Fuller have agreed for it to rest. My reasoning upon this point may be concentrated into a very small compass.

The train of thinking which I am in the habit of indulging, is something like this:—The fall did not annihilate the law by which the first transgression was committed.—The relation of Adam's posterity to the moral law, and their responsibility to God, is the same now as Adam's was before he sinned.—No circumstance arising out of the fall can ever destroy either the relation or obligation.—If a surety is found, he must redeem by fulfilling the violated law and restoring the honour thereof.—Christ was made under that law which we had disregarded—he was made under no other, nor fulfilled any other, with a view of obtaining eternal redemption for his people.—His atonement when applied does not make us sinless.—If that law which he fulfilled is removed, and we have nothing to do with it in any sense whatever, then by what law do we sin? and who is to fulfil that law? I cannot conceive how I am to obtain forgiveness under a law, which Jesus never honoured

with his obedience and death; and if I may be allowed to state my thoughts, it seem to render the condition of the very elect hopeless, excepting however the infant race. For before they are regenerated, they are cursed by the law, and after they believe they are under a law from which there is no redemption. If I do not sin under that law which is said to be abolished, as plainly I cannot if the assertion is true, how am I to be saved? Not by the obedience and blood of Jesus, because he never lived nor died under that law by which I sin. Not by my own disobedience surely? Indeed I cannot be saved at all, which is something like a general sufficiency—an atonement in which there is ‘enough and to spare’—a surplus, generally sufficient for all that are dead, but which allows the living to perish for ever.

*Remark 4.* The atonement as exhibited to the reader in the preceding pages, entirely destroys the notion of offered grace, and affords the strongest encouragement for every individual who is enquiring after the salvation of Jesus Christ.

I have pursued this subject to an unexpected length, which must oblige me to omit other matter prepared for insertion. At first I intended compressing all my observations and enquiries into about eight sixpenny numbers. Before, however, I had proceeded far in my undertaking, I found myself in a similar situation with the novice, who went with an oyster shell to the strand, in order to form a receptacle in the beach for the convenient exhibition of all the waters in the ocean. Every subject with which I have contrasted the doctrines of offered grace, has ramifications which I have not noticed, and which might be made to bear upon the duty-faith system. There are also doctrines which I have not noticed, but which are as strongly opposed to the general scheme, as those which I have examined. But the evidence and proofs which I have accumulated in the course of this work, are sufficient to overturn the doctrines of a motley salvation, pleaded for by general invitation-men, even supposing that those doctrines resembled mountains of lead, instead of heaps of chaff.

I will now briefly notice a few mistaken notions,