

a *new creature*, this would not be *creation*, but *modification*. The man would have no more than what he had before; he would only have his old matter newly disposed, and not a new creature brought into the void of old nature, which seem to be the idea of the passage cited at the head of these remarks.

3. The space which is occupied by the celestial heavens and the earth, never contributed towards the formation of these existences, nor does the sinner.

4. Nothing but *divine power* can create, nor can any thing short of divine power regenerate.

5. Creation was not effected by offers of *power*, nor is regeneration produced by offers of mercy. We despise the idea in the former, why should we court it in the latter. If it is obnoxious in that, it must in this.

6. Creation was *instantaneous*. Jehovah said, "let there be *light*," and the orb of day burst into a dazzling existence, rolled its glowing car in trackless paths, and poured its beams upon the new made globe. Seated on his glowing throne, he shook his mighty torch over the great blank of nature, and kindled up the universe. 'He produced,' says Newton, 'the starry heavens at a single throw.' "He said, and it was done." So in regeneration, he stretches out the lamp of salvation and kindles up all the faculties of the soul. There is no offering nor proffering, tender nor entreaty. He says, "let there be light," and grace immediately lights up the mind. The sun of righteousness is fixed in the centre of the moral and intellectual system, throws its light across the mind, and kindles up the soul for God. In my way of thinking, it is as instantaneous as the shock from the stroke of an electrifying machine, sound from the strike of a hammer upon an unfractured bell, or the emission of light from the sun in the firmament. How can offers of grace and general invitations stand with these things? 'Blest in Christ this *moment* be,' says Mr. Wesley; as if men could give the shock themselves; or, as if God had charged his own word or Mr. Wesley's sermons with divine power, like a coated jar with the electric fluid, but left them to grasp the conducting cord; or what seems more strange, as if they could

bask in the beams of the sun, before the sun is in existence. We see, however, that notwithstanding all the offers of grace, the urgency and assurances of the offerer, and all the flesh-pleasing measures of the day, the wicked will still do wickedly, the distant continue afar off, and the dead in trespasses and sins remain in the grave till they hear the voice of the Son of God, and come forth and live. 'I woke, the dungeon flamed with light.' "Where the *word* of a king is there is *power*." And is not that infinitely better than offers and tenders of mercy without it? Who can safely affirm, that it is not? And let it be remarked likewise, that creation was a *perfect* work. There was no probationary essays, nor no errattas, nor no additions, nor no alterations. No improvement could be made, for he is a rock, and his work was *perfect*: and so is the new creation in the soul. As to *improvements* of grace, and all the rest of it, they seem to me as whimsical as improving the sun by the aid of a dark lantern, or augmenting its blaze by the addition of a *glow-worm*.

Nor can there be any *progression*. There is a perfection both in its nature and degree. What is instantaneously produced cannot be *advanced*; and if regeneration, like creation, is an instantaneous production of a new existence, there can be no more progression in the one than in the other. I formerly thought the new creation was not perfect in its *degree*; but after giving the subject more consideration, I have considerably modified my thoughts on that point; and I now conceive, that the new creation is as *perfect* and complete in its *nature, parts, and degrees* as the old; that it is as sudden in its *production*, and as complete in its *execution*. Nor do I think its *energies* are of a *progressive* character, though I think they may produce progressive effects, just in the same manner as I conceive the energies of the sun are always the same; and yet, owing to the different distances and positions of its respective objects, it may produce effects, distinctly marked by the character of advancement. Thus, darkness may be gradually dispersed, and light as gradually increased; cold may be regularly diminished, and heat

progressively imbibed. Or, if darkness should be the privation of light, and cold the absence of heat, yet both light and heat may be progressively accumulated, and as regularly diminished; and hence seem to arise the different degrees of light and darkness, cold and heat, to which a child of God is subject. I cannot think that the *volume* of grace is any larger in the believer at his natural death, than what it is at his spiritual birth. His light may be more, and his gifts may be greater, but this seem to be the result of a perfect principle acting upon an object in an imperfect situation. It is not *grace* that is a child, a young man, and last of all a father; but the *believer*, whose power of spiritual perception and understanding are gradually developed. But I must remember that I am not writing *short* and *easy* essays, but conducting an important enquiry.

The following questions naturally arise. 1. If divine power *only* is engaged in regeneration, why tell people they will be saved on condition, if they will but pray and repent. 2. If something is brought into the soul that was not there before, must it not be absurd to offer and proffer salvation, as if men could take them when they please, and be religious without being new creatures in Christ Jesus? 3. Is that grace which is said to be offered, what is called the *new creature*, or is it something suited to a mind where the new man exists? If the latter, why are they made to carnal people? and if the former, how can regeneration agree with the idea of creation? Power belongs to God, and is exercised in a manner that is worthy of his character. In his providence he speaketh once, yea, twice, though man perceive it not; but when regeneration is to be effected, he says, "let there be light!" and light as instantly appear. He speaks, and the thing is done; a new creation is effected without the consent of the subject in whom it dwell, because the subject is not consulted; and without his assistance, because he knows nothing of it until he feel its workings which lead to his conversion. The reason why he is called once and again in the former case, is because he is an acting subject, and

a moral agent under the government of divine providence; in the latter, he is neither active nor responsible. Not *active*, because the work is wholly divine; not *answerable*, because creation cannot come under the notion of a law with sanction upon the creature. In the affairs of providence man is an active agent possessed of natural and moral faculties, and therefore ought to use them, not in acts of *creation*, but *obedience*. But in creating or calling into being new existences, he is by no means adapted, nor is he any where required. Now if it is the *duty* of a man to be regenerated, and regeneration is accomplished only by creating power, must it not be the duty of a man to exercise creating power? and if so, must it not be his duty to be omnipotent? and if he is damned for not doing his duty, will he not be damned for not being omnipotent? and if that is the case, must not his punishment proceed upon the ground of *non-acquirements*? His misery does not arise out of positive evil, but the absence of the divine attributes; and, according to this scheme, men are not punished because they have done *positive evil*, but because they have neglected the *simple duty of making themselves God!*

But further, faith can never produce regeneration, because it is an effect which arises out of the principle, and is called into exercise by the operation of the Spirit of God. Col. ii. 12. Now if it is the duty of a man to believe spiritually, it is his duty to produce a *cause* by the *effect*, and if so, it is his duty to do even what omnipotence itself can never perform. Again, if it is a natural man's duty to believe, it cannot be the duty of the Holy Ghost to work faith in him, because that would make duties clash, and thus destroy the wisdom of God. But it is as much the duty of the Holy Spirit to regenerate men, as it was the Son to redeem, or the Father to accept the ransom. Observe, however, that such obligation arose out of their free and mutual stipulations. And it seems far from being clear, that covenant obligation can interfere with creature duty; for it cannot be the duty of the creature and the Holy Ghost, to perform one and the same thing

specifically considered. Now if it is entirely the work of the Holy Ghost to regenerate men, and thus produce the grace of faith, it cannot be the duty of *all* men, nor of *no* man to believe while in a state of nature, unless it is his duty to do the work of God. Nor can I conceive how it can be the duty of a person to have by the law of nature, what is peculiar to the covenant of grace, which must be the case if all men are under obligation to believe savingly in the Lord Jesus Christ. Would my papers allow me to pursue this subject, I am of opinion that I could demonstrate the system of *duty-faith* to be not only unscriptural, but *ridiculously absurd*.

‘O we know they cannot do it.’ Then why exhort them to it? Why offer what they cannot receive, and exhort to what is impracticable? ‘Because we think it is their duty to be all that regenerating grace can make them.’ Then according to this the holiness and righteousness of Christ, is by no means superior to Adam’s. And if this is the case, must not the apostle be grossly mistaken, when he said, the first man was of the earth, earthy, but the second man was the Lord from heaven? And when he observed by way of distinction, “As is the earthy, such are they also that are earthy; and as is the heavenly, such are they also that are heavenly. And as we have borne the image of the earthy, we shall also bear the image of the heavenly.” 1 Cor. xv. 47, 48, 49. Now to affirm that there is no difference between Christ and Adam with respect to their fulness and image, is like affirming that heaven and earth are synonymous terms; and that in short there is no real difference between them whatever. Such things need only to be admitted in order to be refuted.

But regeneration is compared to *the resurrection of the dead*. Eph. i. 19, 20. ii. 1. born vi. 4. ‘The terms life and death,’ says Mr. Hinton, theol. p. 157. ‘when applied to our moral character, are but figurative, and designed to illustrate a right or wrong state of heart. A soul is alive if disposed to love God; if to enmity it is dead; a change of disposition therefore, corresponding

with this statement, is *essentially regeneration.*" Again, "it creates no new faculty of perception, sensibility, or choice: it makes no change in the physical condition of either of these powers, it *simply* alters the *tone of moral sentiment.*" Once more, "*we* should unhesitatingly say, therefore, that even fallen men, labours under no *inability* for moral action."

Now without staying to sift these unscriptural sentences, I would ask Mr. H. how simply altering the tone of moral sentiment, can square with the idea of creation? I will readily allow that the language is figurative, and therefore only analogous to natural circumstances, but still there must be some appropriate realities, or there can be no transfer of idea. *But* how can simply *altering* an old thing answer to the idea of *creating* a new thing? how can the circumstances agree? Again, how can the idea of altering a thing, correspond with the idea of infusing a quickening principle into an inanimate system? For, 1. A disposition is not the *principle*, of either animal or moral existence; but an effect produced by an active cause. 2. The resurrection will not consist in giving a new tone to the old animal life, but in infusing a *new life.* 3. This new life, will produce effects beyond the scope of the first. Flesh and blood will not inherit the kingdom of heaven. 4. The members of the body, will be actuated in a manner which they could not by the former life, and this will arise from the change that will pass upon our sleeping dust. "It is sown a *natural* body, it will be raised a *spiritual* body." 5. This will not be effected, by representing objects to the natural faculties, but by positive power. "The trumpet shall *sound*, and the dead shall be *raised.*" 6. Nor will it be accomplished by a general tender of everlasting things, but by the actual communications of undying life. 7. Nor will this be completed in a progressive manner. "Behold, I shew you a mystery: we shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed, in a moment, in the *twinkling* of an eye, at the last trump." 8. This life, will be incorruptible and unending. Now these seem to me as appropriate realities, being analo-

gous and illustrative of a spiritual resurrection, and entirely repugnant to the nature of offered grace and general invitations.

Lastly. Regeneration is compared to a being born again, John iii. Now this supposes that there is some agreement between the two births, and that the latter resembles the first. The principal circumstances of correspondence seem to be these. 1. The infant is in a state of darkness and unconsciousness; so is the sinner. 2. That in order to discover natural objects, he must quit the regions of darkness for those of light. 3. That there must be a principle of spiritual animation, resembling the principle of natural life. 4. That this principle of spiritual life, must give birth to spiritual perception, desire, choice, and action. 5. That without this, the beauties and blessings of divine grace, could no more be perceived, desired nor enjoyed, than those of nature without a natural life. 6. That the sinner no more contributes towards his second birth than he does towards his first. And this I think is sufficiently obvious, by the operations of the Spirit being compared to the wind, blowing where it listeth.

These things observed, I would ask the following questions. 1. If offers of natural things to people before they are born, would be absurd, where is the propriety of offering spiritual blessings to people before they are spiritually born, seeing the latter is as destitute of spiritual life and perception as the other is of natural life and faculties. 2. If it would be absurd and useless to exhort an infant in the womb to hasten its birth, secure its birth, to be born and blest this moment, &c. is it not as absurd and useless, to exhort sinners to be born when they please? to hasten their conversion, &c. seeing the latter have no more control over spiritual things than the former has over natural? 3. If it would be ridiculous to invite the child to a feast before it is born, can it be either consistent or proper to invite natural men to a spiritual feast before they are spiritually born; seeing the one have no more desire, appetite, will or ability than the other? It will be of no use to say the cases are not parallel in every respect; it is enough if

they are substantially alike, and that they manifestly are. I shall perhaps be told that the comparison I have made is preposterous and absurd. I may be allowed to think (until proofs destroy my opinion) that the reason why some may think it to be ridiculous, is, because it represent a popular system in a ridiculous light.

REDEMPTION BY THE ATONEMENT.

This doctrine is confessed by most denominations, to be of infinite moment; and there can be but little doubt, that such suffrages, occupy primary relations to indispensable principles. If I was solicited to disclose wherein the great strength of mercy's mighty plan consisted, I should unhesitatingly answer, '*in the atonement.*' If asked where a full length portrait of salvation might be obtained, my answer would be ready—'*in the atonement.*' If requested to state through what medium every feature might be viewed in a developed position, I should say, '*the atonement.*' If interrogated as to where all the rays of wisdom, mercy, and justice concentrated, I should reply, '*in the atonement.*' If urged to define the golden fulcrum of a quickened sinner's hope, I should reiterate '*the atonement.*' If tempted to point out the centre-prop of mercy's dome, I should stretch my finger towards '*the atonement.*' If asked what was the best criterion of christian doctrine, I should instantly rejoin, '*the atonement.*' In my mind it is the sun in the spiritual system; and to wrench it from the scheme of salvation, is like plucking the sun from its orbit, which, like the globe, would be rendered dark, dull, dreary, and useless to those for whom it is intended.

Most people who are in the habit of thinking over religious subjects, must be aware of the important relation which subsist between the atonement and the form of divine administration. It is with the most intense anxiety that I have sought after and read, every thing that I could procure which have a bearing upon the subject under notice; and I must acknowledge, if it can be done without giving offence, that my anxiety

has only been equalled by the disappointment and mortification which have closed my perusals. But never was my anxiety greater, or my mortification deeper, than on the last research. It had been frequently said by some of the Wesleyans, 'why do he not attack Mr. *Drew*? Were he not too *despicable* for Mr. D. the enquiry would be soon overthrown,'* &c. This produced a thirst after the 'Essay on the Being, Attributes, and Providence of the Deity. By S. Drew.' But what was my surprize, when I saw two thin octavo volumes, pages 339—370, price *eighteen shillings!* the whole of which might have been easily compressed into one volume 12mo. But my mortification was not yet complete; for on examining the new and dear-bought treasure, I had the vexation to behold an imperfect copy of Archbishop King, the original of which was standing in my study. As to that part of the work which treat upon the moral attributes of God, the major part of the reasoning if stretched into its respective ramifications, is decidedly opposed to the chief tenets of Wesleyanism. But perhaps Mr. D. was not thinking about any religious theory at the time those sections were penned, being, as he informs his reader, contending for a literary prize. Let it not, however, be thought, that I wish to depreciate the claims that Mr. D. or any one else, has to literary acquirements or public indulgence; for when their claims are fairly

* It has been said by some, and it is easy to guess who, that my sentiments come from h—l, that they are the very scum of the bottomless pit—that Calvinists must be worse than *highway-men*—that the 'Free Enquiry' will send thousands to h—l, and that the writer will be sure to accompany them; with other things equally genteel and classical. Now, if the 'Enquiry' is likely to be so very fertile in its destructive operations, it is hoped that the obscurity of the writer, will not be a barrier to its refutation, nor the means of plunging thousands into unending misery. And as Mr. D. occupies a situation where the energies of *free-will* reasoners are concentrated in due polemical form, we may judge it will be as little trouble for him to counteract its action as any one beside. It may not however be amiss to observe, that I had not my eye fixed on methodism as a leading object, but something of greater consideration, though of a more motley nature and mongrel character. My ambition did not lead me to the amputation of gnats, but the dissection of a giant. Neither had I any thoughts of angling for sprats, shooting flies, or *storming a house of cards*.

made, they seldom receive above a penny-worth for their penny, and the workman is worthy of his meat.

Having made these remarks, I will now return to the subject of the atonement; upon which subject I submit the following propositions.

Prop. 1. There must be a Divine Being from whom we derive our existence, support, and protection.

Prop. 2. This Divine Being must be necessarily *eternal, immense, and immutable*. Supposing this to be granted,

Prop. 3. A Being of such perfections must possess *eternal rectitude*. If God is immense (and that he unquestionably is) he must be infinite in all his attributes, consequently his wisdom and holiness must partake of that character; and if so, he must be a God of endless order and unbending integrity.

Prop. 4. A Being whose love of order is every where conspicuous, must require the same character of his intelligent creatures, supposing him to have any. This needs no illustration.

Prop. 5. A conformity to order, can only be required upon the principle of a law, introduced and understood. To suppose the contrary, would be to reflect in no sparing manner upon the wisdom and justice of God.

Prop. 6. This Divine Being, must be the author of a law to his intelligent creatures, which brings them under obligation, and renders them amenable to the author of their existence.

Prop. 7. This law while it supposes a liberty which may be abused, must nevertheless, be adapted to the primeval condition and capacity of his obeying creatures.

Prop. 8. A law agreeing with the nature and extent of the human faculties, must also be in accordance with the attributes and perfections of the lawgiver. The law must be a transcript of the Deity—a copy of an original—a portrait of himself; and as such, must answer to his attributes both natural and moral, as a copy answers to an original print, &c.

Prop. 9. A law commensurate with the perfections of Deity, must be sacred, immense, immutable, and eternal.

Prop. 10. Every breach of this law, must bear a relation to the perfections of God, and in consequence of such a relation must become *objectively* infinite.

Prop. 11. A law protecting his perfections and preserving his creatures in happiness, must be attended with motives and sanction. Motives to produce rectitude of action, and power to enforce and maintain the just claims of the law-giver.

Prop. 12. A law with such obligatory power, embracing objects of infinite magnitude and interest, must inflict its penalty wherever it is incurred.

Prop. 13. As justice is natural and essential to God, the correctness of its requirements can never be disputed, nor the integrity of its manifestations be impugned. Whether it is exercised in either a vindictive, or remunerative, or any other form, the rectitude of its manifestations may always be depended upon even should we be unable to perceive it. This I presume will not be questioned.

Prop. 14. If the integrity of all the exercises of justice may be with safety depended upon, then the infliction of penalty must be regulated by the actions of the transgressor, and the nature, number, and magnitude of the transgressions, must determine and fix the extent of their suffering; just as the nature, number, and magnitude of meritorious actions, would guide the hand of distributive justice. The extent of merit and demerit, would measure the rewards of the one and the misery of the other. In short, justice cannot make *more* than a fair reward, or less than an equitable claim; nor *vice versa*.

Prop. 15. No transgressor can either arrest the progress, or turn the course of the law, by which he is, or must be, arrested and prosecuted. This would suppose him to be stronger than Omnipotence, or wiser than divine wisdom, or rather, too crafty for his law and justice; which would imply imperfection in his law and character.

Prop. 16. If a sinner avoids the infliction of the penalty when incurred, it must be through the medium

of a *surety*, because he is unable to meet the claims which are made upon him, in his own person.

Prop. 17. This suretyship must be founded on the ground of substitution, or which is the same thing, by putting Christ in the place of those for whom he became surety, and in that situation to receive the same treatment at the hand of justice which they must have done, supposing that he had not been their surety. If not, the law would be injured, the honours of justice would be humbled, and a place of never-ending suffering justly questioned.

Prop. 18. The atonement is of a substitutionary and therefore vicarious character. I have said, page 82, that 'I know of no sect that will admit, and much more contend, for general redemption upon a vicarious plan.' I wish to be understood as referring to redemption accomplished by Immanuel, as the surety and substitute of all those who are and will be eternally saved, and who are familiarly known to the lovers of truth, by the names, *elect*—election of *grace*—elect of *God*—*his* elect, &c.

Prop. 19. A surety and substitute, answering to precisely the same claims which would have been made on those for whom he interfered, must release from condign punishment all who are involved in his suretyship engagements and substitutionary sacrifice. And not merely, that as a *simple consequence*, but as a *necessary production*—a *necessary* effect, from a *voluntary* cause.

Prop. 20. Spiritual deliverance is a matter both of *right* and *grace*. *Right*, on the part of the surety and sinner, and of *grace*, on the part of the lawgiver and judge. Observe, this grace arose out of that construction which infinite wisdom put upon the law, so as to admit of a substitutionary satisfaction. Favour is therefore the *root* of right; and regarding salvation as the *tree of life*, the believer has it both in its root and branches, as Jehovah's *favour*, Immanuel's *purchase*, the Spirit's *unction*, and his own *right*.

Prop. 21. Redemption is *complete*, *infallible*, and eternal. *Complete*—this is argued from the resurrec-

tion of Christ, which was effected by the virtue of his *official* power, or by the blood of the everlasting covenant. *Infallible*—or the nature and relations of suretyship and substitution must be destroyed, the sinner's right denied, the Saviour's purchase lost, Jehovah's character disgraced, and the rectitude of his justice destroyed. *Eternal*—because in heaven, the abuse of liberty will be prevented.

Prop. 22. The *administration* of salvation must accord with its nature and design. The *manner* of its being dispensed, must answer to its character and the intentions of its author, or they must be allowed to contradict each other; and if the nature and character of the form of their conveyance, disagree with the nature and character of the things to be administered, and God has chosen these means and modes, then God must be chargeable with *disorder*; but to charge him with disorder, is to charge him with *sinning*; and to charge him with sinning is daring presumption and *horrible blasphemy*.

Prop. 23. If the nature and mode of the administration, must agree with the nature and character of the things imparted, then salvation must be administered in absolute and positive forms, because the salvation is absolute and certain.

Prop. 24. There can be no such thing as *offers of grace, and general invitations*; because such a mode of dispensing them, is at direct and open variance with the nature of redemption and the design of its author. To prove this, we need not call in the aid of metaphysics, nor the art of logical sophistry. The conclusion is easy, and its facility is only equalled by its correctness and strength. Christ is the surety and substitute of his people; his obedience was complete, and the measure of his sufferings was full—the effects of his obedience and blood are conveyed to his spiritual posterity, as the effects of Adam's transgression are conveyed to his natural offspring, which is to *all*, and *no more*. The effects can never be destroyed nor diverted from their purposed line of obligation, either in the one case or the other. Necessary effects can never be

offered conditionally, so as to be rendered uncertain as to their operation, or the *time* and *place* of their operation; and if the blessings of salvation are necessary effects of immutable causes, it must be the greatest absurdity in the world to offer them to all, as if they were obtainable by all, when, in point of fact, they are given only to some, and even to them they flow as effects from the most productive causes.

Mr. Dwight, whose objections to this view of redemption I shall examine in a proper place, thought the atonement must be sufficient for the unelected part of mankind because Christ could not be offered to all mankind, without such being the case. Such a mode of reasoning, is like attempting to prove one error by another error. Mr. Fuller made this concession, that ‘If the measure of his (Christ’s) sufferings were according to those for whom he died, in such a manner as that if more had been saved, his sorrows must have been proportionably increased; it might, for aught I know, be inconsistent with indefinite invitations.’ Now I have fairly proved that his sufferings were proportioned to the guilt of those for whom he died, and ‘for aught I know,’ the proofs must be admitted.

But it is easy to accumulate evidence, if more evidence can possibly be desired; and amongst the numerous sources from whence additional proofs may be drawn is, I. The *covenant of grace*. In the preceding papers, I have fully proved that there is such a thing as the covenant of grace; and it must be noticed, that the blood of Christ is called the “blood of the everlasting covenant.” Heb. xiii. 20. I have observed, that this covenant signifies to *dispose, arrange, methodize, &c.* and that it was ratified, by cutting, slaughtering, dividing, &c. thus resting its importance upon the purifying and sacrificial offering of the great High Priest. I have also further proved, that in the new testament it answers to a person’s disposing of his property by a *will*, and is therefore a *testamentary will*. His blood is also obviously represented as being necessarily attached to this testament, as a seal is impressed on the instrument of a person’s will. These

things will now be assumed as facts, respecting which no serious discussion can arise ; and the inferences that may be fairly drawn are the following :—

1. *That he died for those, and those only, who are properly disposed, and distinctly mentioned in the covenant of grace.* It is absurd to suppose that he died for any more, because the very nature and representation of the covenant excludes every such supposition ; and if people are determined to retain such ideas, it must arise either from perverseness, or imbecility of intellect, or both united, or from some secret phenomenon, perhaps nobody can be sure what.

2. *That he died for all his covenant ones, or those for whom he covenanted.* We are told “he gave his life a ransom for *many*.” And it is equally affirmed that he gave his life a ransom for *all* ; *i. e.* all the many. The words, *ransom for many*, constitute a term of numerical comparison ; thus, he gave his life a ransom for *many* ; it was possible for him to have ransomed *more* ; yea, he might have ransomed *all* mankind. But he has not—he gave his life a ransom for *many* ; for a definite number, not for more, not for *all* mankind. Now this involves two important ideas. 1. The idea of exclusion. If he died for *many* the rest are excluded. 2. Certainty. He died for *many*, not for *any*. But it is said, “he gave his life a ransom for *all*.” This phrase is descriptive of *numerical perfection* ; the whole of the *many*, the sheep, the children, the legatees, the elect ; the *many* sons whom he will bring to glory. Heb. ii. 10.

3. He suffered the exact measure of wrath which was due to their transgressions. Should it be said this is begging the question, I would ask, did he not die for their sins agreeable to covenant agreements ? If so, did he die for *all* their sins, or for some *only* ? If the former, must he not expiate those sins by suffering what the sinner deserved ? If he suffered for some *only*, or for *many*, or *most*, how could his redemption be perfect ? How came it to be accepted ? And who is to die for the *rest* ? “For Christ having once died, dieth no more, death hath no more dominion over *him*.”

But there is no doubt of its having eternal dominion over *us*, if Christ did not die for *all*, and every sin, of which we are or shall be guilty; for without shedding of blood there is no remission of sins. To contend that he died only for some of their sins, is to contend that he *expiated* only some of their sins, and this is equal to affirming that there are some sins which are not atoned for; which is equivalent to asserting that God can pardon some sins without an atonement, or else that the sinner can make expiation himself, or otherwise that the elect must perish in everlasting perdition. I imagine these things will not be anxiously coveted, and therefore conclude that the antithesis must be admitted. But its admission demonstrates the point in dispute.

2. If more proofs are demanded, more are at hand, and I am ready to advance more, drawn from the nature and character of the Redeemer's suretyship. Assuming that the apostle's declaration, Heb. vii. 22. will be sufficient to prove that Christ is a Surety, I shall content myself with barely citing the passage to which I have referred. It stands thus, "By so much was Jesus made a *surety* of a better testament."

The Hebrew כִּוַּץ signifies according to Frey's Dictionary, '*Miscuit, negotiatus est, spondit, pignatus est: amœnus, suavis fuit; obtenebratus est. He mixed, was employed, traded, became surety, pawned, mortgaged, was sweet, pleasant; was darkened.*' It may not be displeasing to the reader if I notice in a brief manner some of the different forms in which this word is employed. As a verb in *hith*, it signifies to *mix, mingle one's self*, be mingled, Ezra ix. 2. Ps. cvi. 35. Prov. xiv. 10. xx. 19. xxiv. 21. It is used to denote the mixture of the celestial fluids in which God is said to ride, fly, &c. Deut. xxxiii. 26. 2 Sam. xxii. 11. Ps. lxxviii. 34. Sometimes it refers to the after part of the day, because the western darkness begins to mingle with the day as soon as the sun crosses the meridian line. Gen. i. 5. Deut. xxiii. 11. Between the evenings, is the period between noon and sunset; the first evening commencing when the western air mixes with the

day, the second when the sun is set, and the dark air mixes with the twilight until the darkness finally prevail. Hence, between the evenings, is literally *between the mixtures*. 'If it be asked,' says Parkhurst, 'why ערב never signifies the *morning mixture* of light and darkness, as well as the evening one: the true answer seems to be, because the first mixture of darkness and light was, by God's supernatural agency, made at the *evening* or western edge of the earth, as is intimated to us by the evening being mentioned before the morning, Gen. i. 5. *and there was ערב evening, and there was morning the first day*. At the *evening* or western edge then was the first mixture or push of the spirit or darkness into the light; which observation also clears another considerable difficulty, namely, why the earth revolves from west to east, rather than from east to west.' By a metaphor it denotes the privation of joy. Thus Isa. xxiv. 11. all joy is darkened ערבה is *mixed*, obscured; lost as the day by being mingled with the night. In Cant. v. 11. it designs a mixture of darkness and splendour. "His locks are bushy and *black as a raven*" — *are bushy*, i. e. his hair is *thick, beautifully curled*, and hang in *graceful ringlets*, and the whole covered with a fine shining gloss, gives the appearance of a raven in the sun; black hair was reckoned a great ornament among both the Jews and Romans. It is also used to denote a species of *willow*, because there is a mixture of white and green, Lev. xxiii. 40. Isa. xlv. 4. It is frequently used in reference to the *woof* in weaving, by which means the threads become *mixed*, and complicated. Lev. xiii. 48. It is not unusually employed to denote a *desart*, because there rocks and precipices are *mixed*, and blended together in an intricate manner. At other times it is used to signify the ready union and agreement of homogeneous substances or principles—to suit, to be agreeable: to mix or unite in a ready manner. Thus Psal. cxix. 34. "My meditation עליו concerning him ערב shall be agreeable (to me) shall not be rejected, but readily *mix with my mind*, and mingle with every thought." Again, Prov. iii. 21. "Thou shall lie down and thy sleep shall be sweet,"

i. e. shall readily and quickly lay hold on, and shall mix or mingle with the physical powers of both body and mind. In Ez. xvi. 37. it signifies to *mix in love*. Behold, therefore I will gather all thy lovers אשר ערבת עליהם *with whom thou hast mixed*: i. e. in infamous intercourse, criminal alliances, and idolatrous practices. In chapter xxvii. 27. of the same prophecy it denotes, to be mixed in the engagements of commercial intercourse. “IX in Kal, transitively, to *mix, join, be joined or interwoven* with another in *contracts*, to be *surety, bondsman, or engaged* for him. Gen. xliii. 9. xliv. 32. Ps. cxix. 122. So with ל following, Prov. vi. 1. Also, transitively, to *pledge, engage, or mortgage*, lands or houses, q. d. to *mix* them with oneself in a contract. Neh. v. 3. com. Prov. xvii. 18. Jer. xxx. 21. In Hith. *To engage oneself, enter into contract with* another, *to give security* to him, 2 Kings xviii. 23. Isa. xxxvi. 8. As a N. ערב a *pledge or surety*, Job. xvii. 3. *Appoint now* my pledge or surety *with thee*, namely, that I will stand trial with thee, or thou with me. See Scott. Com. Prov. xxii. 26. fem. ערבה *sponson security*, Prov. xvii. 18. As a N. ערבון, a *pledge, security*, occ. Gen. xxxviii. 17, 18—20. In all which passages the LXX render it by the Greek derivative Ἀρραβων, which see in *Greek and English Lexicon*. As a N. fem. plur. תער בית *pledges*. So תער בותבני *persons given in pledge, hostages*, occ. 2 Kings xiv. 14. 2 Chron. xxv. 24.”—*Parkhurst on ערב*.

The meaning of the greek word, Εγγυος, may also illustrate and confirm this subject, which is derived from a word signifying a *pledge* or *pawn*. Take Parkhurst’s explanation, “Εγγυος, ου, ο, from εγγυη a *pledge, or pawn*, so called from being lodged εν γυοις, in *the hands* of the creditor.”

A sponsor, *surety*, occ. Heb. vii. 22. see *Wolfius*. This word occurs not in the LXX but they use the N. εγγυη for the Heb. ערבה *suretyship, joining with another in contract*, Prov. xvii. 18. and the V. mid. εγγυασμας, *to make one’s self a surety*, for the V. ערב. Prov. vi. 1.—xvii. 18.

“He being *God-man*, is a *surety*, one that bindeth