

strong presumptive proof of its truth; so a general reluctance to receive it, is an equal evidence of its falsehood. The doctrine of the incarnation, consequently, having something in it repugnant to the minds of men in general, ought to be rejected as void of truth."—But there is a vast difference between rejecting a principle as contradictory to some *known, established* truth, and finding it *naturally incomprehensible*. The *former* is a character of its falsehood; the *latter* of its sublimity. There are some universal repugnances of the senses, of the imagination, and of the mind itself, which do not conclude against the reality of their objects. For example: The senses tell those that view from the ground an Egyptian pyramid, that the summit of it is almost like the spire of a steeple; and though all mankind were to see it in that situation, they would universally agree that it terminates in a point. But reason, judging of the distance and proportion of the object, as well as being assisted by experiment, corrects the error; and, notwithstanding this universal language of the senses, convinces you that the top of the pyramid is a platform capable of holding fifty men. Human *imagination* has an aversion, universally, to represent to itself men, who, without falling, have their feet diametrically opposite to ours. Yet reason corrects this error, and puts it beyond a doubt that there are antipodes. The *minds* of all mankind are naturally shocked at what philosophers and geometricians assert, concerning the infinite divisibility of matter; and yet, on inquiry, we cannot but assent to the truth of the strange assertion, notwithstanding this universal repugnancy. May we not, then, conclude, that though all men found something offensive to them in this proposition, "The Word was made flesh;" or, "God was made man;"